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Abstract: Effectively adding security measures to a multicast 
service is an intriguing problem, especially when the service is 
deployed in a wireless setting. Next generation IEEE 802.16 
standard WirelessMAN networks are a perfect example of this 
problem, and the latest draft specification of the standard 
includes a secure protocol solution called Multicast and 
Broadcast Rekeying Algorithm (MBRA).  In this paper, we 
expose the security problems of MBRA, including non-scalability 
and omission of backward and forward secrecy, and propose 
new approaches, ELAPSE and ELAPSE+, to address these 
problems. In particular, ELAPSE+ makes use of membership 
and mobility information gathered in the application layer to 
augment the adaptive group management in the MAC layer. We 
analyze the security property of ELAPSE and ELAPSE+, and 
compare their performances with MBRA by simulating group 
rekeying scenarios. 
  Index terms: 802.16 WirelessMAN, Multicast, Privacy and 
Key Management (PKM) Protocol, Multicast and Broadcast 
Rekeying Algorithm (MBRA), Efficient sub-Linear rekeying 




There are many emerging applications that depend on 
secure group communications, which require the privacy of 
participants and access control at the multicast server.  On the 
other hand, scalability is another critical concern for the 
multicast service underlying these applications due to the 
possible large number of group members. In the domain of 
wired networks, efficient and secure multicast is a widely 
studied problem and several popular protocols have been 
proposed. This is not necessarily true for the domain of 
wireless networks, where attention has been less significant.  
Wireless networks have become more and more pervasive 
due to their many advantages. The IEEE 802.16 standard [1] 
aims to provide broadband wireless access for Metropolitan 
Area Networks (MAN) and the recently released IEEE 
802.16e [2] adds mobility features and some other functions 
including multicast. Multicast in Wireless Metropolitan Area 
Networks (WirelessMAN) is a promising service, suitable for 
many applications, such as stock option bidding, pay per view 
TV broadcasting, video conferencing, etc., for both fixed and 
mobile subscriber stations (SS).  
The challenge of a secure multicast service, such as the one 
in IEEE 802.16, is to provide an efficient method for 
controlling access to the group and its communications.  
Encryption of group messages and selective distribution of the 
keys used for encryption is the primary method for ensuring 
the security. For a dynamic group in which membership 
changes frequently, the rekeying algorithm employed by the 
service is a critical ingredient of the overall service efficiency.  
This algorithm should guarantee forward secrecy, which 
prevents a leaving member from accessing future 
communications; and backward secrecy, which prevents a 
joining member from accessing former communications. On 
the other hand, a rekeying algorithm should be efficient as 
well. That means it should be scalable to a large group and 
exhibit good performance during key distribution, in which 
the performance is measured in terms of communication 
complexity, center (server) space complexity, and user 
(member) space complexity. 
This paper reviews the Privacy and Key Management 
(PKM) protocol (with respect to the multicast setting) and the 
Multicast and Broadcast Rekeying Algorithm (MBRA) in 
IEEE 802.16e.  The weaknesses of these protocols are 
detailed. The Efficient sub-Linear rekeying Algorithm with 
Perfect Secrecy (ELAPSE) protocol, a derivative of the 
Logical Key Hierarchy, and the ELAPSE+ protocol, an 
improved version of ELAPSE, are proposed.  An overview of 
ELAPSE can be found in our preliminary work [3].  ELAPSE 
overcomes the lack of backward and forward secrecy of the 
802.16 MBRA and operates more efficiently overall. The 
extended version, ELAPSE+, makes use of membership and 
mobility information gathered in the application layer to 
augment the adaptive group management in the MAC layer.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section II, 
we review the IEEE 802.16e solution to secure multicast 
rekeying, with its weaknesses emphasized.  In Section III, 
related works on other approaches to secure multicast are 
described. A complete description of our approaches ELAPSE 
and ELAPSE+ are presented in Section IV and V, 
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respectively.  In Section VI, the performance of MBRA, 
ELAPSE, and ELAPSE+ are analyzed based on our 
simulation of different group rekeying scenarios. Our 
conclusions are made in Section VII. 
 
II. CURRENT 802.16E STANDARD 
 
The Multicast and Broadcast Service in IEEE 802.16 is an 
efficient and power saving mechanism, which also provides 
subscribers with strong protection from theft of service by 
encrypting broadcast connections between an SS and BS.  
The Multicast and Broadcast Rekeying Algorithm (MBRA) is 
used to refresh traffic keying material for the multicast service 
of IEEE 802.16.  Prior to receiving multicast service, an SS 
must register and authenticate with a base station (BS), during 
which the BS decides the level of service to be authorized.  
By use of the ranging procedure on the Initial Ranging or 
Basic Connection, an SS establishes a Primary Management 
Connection with a BS that is used to exchange MAC 
management messages.  If the SS is to be managed, a 
Secondary Management Connection is established between 
the SS and BS.  A Secondary Management Connection is 
used to transfer delay-tolerant, standards-based messages 
within IP datagrams such as DHCP, TFTP, and SNMP. 
The Privacy Key Management messages are exchanged 
through the Primary Management Connection, with the 
exception that PKMv2 Group-Key-Update-Command is 
transferred over the Broadcast Connection.  The Privacy and 
Key Management (PKM) protocol is applied in the IEEE 
802.16 security sublayer within the 802.16 MAC layer and 
performs two functions.  First, the PKM protocol provides 
secure distribution of keying material from a BS to SS, and 
second, the protocol enables a BS to enforce access control 
over network services.  A brief summary of a PKM protocol 
run between an SS and BS is as follows.  The SS initiates the 
protocol and first authenticates with a BS (PKMv2 also 
provides mutual authentication), establishing a shared secret 
— an Authentication Key (AK).  The BS will also send a 
Secure Association Identifier (SAID) list, which indicates the 
services explicitly authorized to the SS. Then by a Key-REQ 
message from SS to BS and Key-RSP message from BS to 
SS, the SS receives the keying material that is appropriate for 
a specified SAID.  Before proceeding with the details of the 
current standard, let us briefly discuss a trivial solution for 
securing multicast traffic. 
 
A.  A Trivial Solution 
  In this trivial solution, multicast traffic is sent from the BS 
to all SS encrypted using a single group wide session key, or 
Group Traffic Encryption Key (GTEK).  It is assumed that all 
SS have the current key ready to decrypt the multicast data.  
When a new SS wishes to join the group, an individual 
request is sent to the BS for the GTEK.  The BS responds to 
the new SS with a new GTEK, and then also sends the 
updated GTEK to all existing SS individually (all individual 
exchanges are encrypted with keys established through a 
previous authentication mechanism).  When a member wishes 
to leave the group, the BS must again send a new GTEK to all 
other SS individually.  Although offering strong backward 
and forward secrecy, this trivial solution has many problems, 
most importantly not being scalable due to the many unicast 
key exchanges. 
 
B.  802.16 Standard 
The IEEE 802.16 standard offers some improvement to this 
trivial solution.  A lifetime is specified for the GTEK and thus 
the GTEK will expire after a certain amount of time.  To 
ensure timely delivery of new GTEKs before expiration of the 
current one, the use of a Group Key Encryption Key (GKEK) 
is specified.  The GKEK has a lifetime that parallels the 
lifetime of the corresponding GTEK.  By using this GKEK to 
encrypt the GTEK, new GTEKs can be broadcast to all SS. 
An SS may get the initial GTEK, which is used to encrypt 
the multicast traffic, by Key Request and Key Reply messages 
over the Primary Management Connection.  A BS updates and 
distributes the traffic keying material periodically by sending 
two Group Key Update Command messages: for the GKEK 
update mode and for the GTEK update mode.  The Group 
Key Encryption Key (GKEK) is used to encrypt the GTEK in 
GTEK update mode.  Intermittently, a BS transmits the (1) 
Key Update Command message for GKEK update mode to 
each SS through its Primary Management Connection.  This 
message contains the new GKEK encrypted with the Key 
Encryption Key (KEK), which is derived from the 
Authorization Key (AK) established during authentication.  
Then, the BS transmits the (2) Key Update Command 
message for GTEK update mode through the Broadcast 
Connection, which contains the new GTEK encrypted with 
the corresponding GKEK. The protocol can be specified as 
follows. 
BS  SS : {GKEK}KEK    (1) 
BS ⇒ all SS : {GTEK}GKEK    (2) 
where  stands for a unicast message and ⇒ stands for a 
broadcast message. 
There are still two problems with this protocol. Firstly, this 
protocol is not scalable as it still needs to unicast to each SS. 
It can be generalized, especially in a potentially large network 
such as a WirelessMAN, that any rekeying scheme depending 
on unicast methods is not scalable. Secondly, this protocol 
does not address the issue of backward and forward secrecy. 
In the case of member joining, when a new member receives 
the current GTEK, it can decrypt all previous messages that 
were multicast during the lifetime of the same GTEK. In the 
case of member leaving, there is nothing in this protocol that 
prevents a leaving SS from receiving the next GKEK and 
decrypting the next GTEK. 
Note that the lifetimes of GTEKs as specified by the IEEE 
802.16 standard are an important security consideration.  
Currently, the range is specified to be 0.5 hours minimum, 12 
hours by default, and 7 days maximum [3].  This lifetime has 
great leverage on the relationship between scalability and 
forward/backward secrecy provided by the standard.  A long 
enough lifetime needs to be maintained to allow a BS enough 
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time to individually update the GKEK so that the new GTEK 
can be broadcast.  However, longer GTEK lifetimes imply 
much greater lapses in backward/forward secrecy on member 
join/leave events, respectively, as there will be more messages 
encrypted using the given GTEK. 
 
III. RELATED WORKS 
 
Since the first version of the IEEE 802.16 standard [4] was 
released in 2002, a few articles and books have been 
published.  In [5], the chair of the standard gives a technical 
overview of IEEE 802.16.  Some 802.16 group members also 
published a book [6] in 2006, which provides a detailed 
overview of the standard and explains the rationale behind 
development decisions. The authors of [7] review the 
standard, analyze the security provided by the standard, and 
discuss the requirement of mutual authentication between SS 
and BS.  In [8] the PKM protocol is discussed in detail, more 
attacks on the versions of the PKM protocols listed in [4] and 
[6] are discovered, and revisions of PKM protocols are 
proposed.  In [9], another attack on PKM version 2 in [2] is 
detailed. However, none of these publications cover the 
MBRA version released in earlier 2006 [2].  
There is a report [10] which analyzes the IEEE 802.16 
MBRA, which especially focuses on replay attacks against the 
MBRA, similar to the attacks listed in [7], [8] and [9].  
However, it does not cover the backward and forward secrecy 
afforded to communications before/after rekeying, or the 
efficiency of the MBRA, both of which are paramount to a 
desirable, secure rekeying algorithm.  
 More generally, secure multicast has been a popular topic 
in the past ten years, and many protocols have been proposed.  
[11] and [12] are the first few works dealing with secure 
multicast, in which straightforward, yet not scalable methods, 
are described.  The Iolus approach detailed in [13] is a 
distributed method in which a hierarchy of agents are used as 
subgroup controllers.  Using Iolus, scalability is ensured 
because member changes in one subgroup do not affect other 
subgroups.  It also provides other promising features such as 
fault-tolerance.  However, Iolus may not be directly 
applicable to the 802.16 environment in which there is only 
one server (BS) and a number of clients (SS), and may not 
make the best use of the property of 802.16 that every SS 
within the radio range of BS can receive the multicast 
messages in one hop. Kronos [18], takes a unique periodical 
rekeying approach that rekeys the group only at specified time 
intervals. Customary rekeying upon member changes are 
delayed until the next rekeying interval, therefore the number 
of rekeying is reduced. 
Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) tree algorithms are proposed 
in [14] and [15], which provide O(log n) communication 
complexity, where n is the number of group members.  There 
are three schemes in the Versa-key framework [16], one of 
which is a centralized tree-based management scheme.  It 
applies a one-way function to update a key tree upon 
members joining, and thus is also referred to as LKH+.  In 
[17] a hybrid system is proposed that integrates LKH with a 
simple flat scheme, providing a family of key management 
algorithms according to the degree of tree internal nodes and 
the number of members in each subgroup.  Each subgroup is 
then organized as a leaf in the LKH tree.  By dividing the 
group into subgroups with O(log n) members, the algorithm 
exhibits only O(n/log n) server space complexity.  The 
authors of [17] claim it is the first rekeying algorithm to 
require only sub-linear space at the server.  Besides, as a 
variation to all the above schemes, Rodeh et al [18] proposed 
a completely distributed group key management scheme 
which lets the members “agree” on the associated subgroup 
keys and eventually the overall group key in a distributed 
manner, thus waiving the need of a centralized server.  
However, this scheme is not suitable for 802.16 
WirelessMAN due to the asymmetry in communication; that 
is, unlike the BS, an SS may not have the transmission 
capability to reach other SS in the group.   
In this paper, ELAPSE, an alternative to the IEEE802.16 
MBRA is proposed.  ELAPSE is a more efficient alternative 
that provides complete backward and forward secrecy to 
communications, and integrates the advantages of the 





We have established that MBRA published in the latest 
802.16 standard is insufficient.  As we have shown, the 
MBRA offers only modest improvements over a trivial 
solution.  A proper solution should maintain backward 
secrecy and forward secrecy.  From these goals, an improved 
MBRA must re-key on member joins, on member leaves, and 
periodically if there is no member join or member leave.  
Also, an improved MBRA must be scalable so that its 
complexity is less than O(n) with respect to the size of the 
group. 
The focus of the approach presented here will be sub-
grouping SS so that the GKEK will not be maintained via 
unicasting to individual SS, but via broadcasting to sub-
groups.  For every cell of a BS and many SS in a multicast 
application, the SS will be sub-grouped into N = 2k sub-
groups, with each sub-group maintaining k keys.  The exact 
value of N is to be determined by the implementer to offer the 
best performance for a given application.  For example, an 
application that averages 600 SS may pick a value of N = 8 
sub-groups, with each sub-group averaging 75 members and 
maintaining k = 3 keys.  When a new SS requests keying 
material, it will be grouped into the sub-group with the lowest 
member count.  This is done to keep the sub-groups balanced 
in size.  Otherwise, one sub-group may become very large 
with respect to the others and the efficiency of re-keying 
drops significantly. Meanwhile, this sub-grouping scheme has 
the advantage of avoiding the tree rebalancing cost as 
indicated in [20]. 
Each sub-group maintains a hierarchy of sub-group KEKs 
(SGKEK) instead of a single GKEK.  According to a binary 
tree hierarchy, each SS within a sub-group will store k 
SGKEKs.  Fig.1 shows the case for N = 4.  In the figure, note 
that sub-group 1 stores SGKEK1, SGKEK12, and SGKEK1234, 
and that SGKEK1234 will function as the traditional GKEK 
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SGKEK1 SGKEK2 SGKEK3 SGKEK4
sub-group2 sub-group3 sub-group4
 
Fig. 1  Sample key hierarchy with 4 sub-groups 
 
In the simplest case of re-keying, there are no member joins 
or leaves.  For reference, every GTEK lifetime shall define a 
multicast session.  In this case the GTEK, or session, expires 
due to time with no membership changes.  The lifetime of the 
GTEK remains the same as it is in the 802.16 standard.  In 
this case only one message needs to be sent. 
BS ⇒ all SS : {GTEK}SGKEK1234   (3) 
The next case shall be re-keying due to a member join.  The 
member join starts off as it does in the original specification 
with a key request sent from SS to BS, and a key reply sent 
from BS to SS.  However, the key reply is modified to include 
a new hierarchy of SGKEKs.  So for example when a new SS 
joins and sub-group 2 is currently the sub-group with the 
lowest number of members, the key reply is like message (4), 
with all keys being not current, but updated versions. 
BS  new SS : {SGKEK1234, SGKEK12, SGKEK2}KEK 
(4) 
Message (4) is delivered to all existing SS inside sub-group 
2 via unicast as well.  While (4) is being delivered, the BS re-
keys all existing SS with new versions of appropriate keys in 
parallel.  Continuing with the same situation of a SS joining 
sub-group 2, (5) and (6) would be delivered to re-key all SS 
not in sub-group 2.   
BS ⇒ SSSG3, SSSG4 : {SGKEK1234}SGKEK34  (5) 
BS ⇒ SSSG1 : {SGKEK1234, SGKEK12}SGKEK1 (6) 
where SSSGi means the collection of SS within sub-group i. 
The updated GTEK is not included in these messages for a 
performance reason.  If during the updates, more SS attempt 
to join, the situation has not changed.  We will refer to this 
situation as a “multi-join”.  To maintain efficiency, in a multi-
join event the BS waits until all joining SS arrive and then 
places them into the same sub-group, which was the sub-
group with lowest number of members at the start of the 
event, regardless if adding all the joining SS results in the 
sub-group not being the smallest anymore.  The only addition 
in the case of a multi-join instead of a single join would be 
another message (4) to each additional SS joining the service.  
At the conclusion of all SGKEK updates during a join or 
multi-join, the new GTEK is broadcast to all SS with message 
(7). 
BS ⇒ all SS : {GTEK}SGKEK1234   (7) 
On a member leaving the multicast service, re-keying 
proceeds almost exactly as a complete re-keying does for a 
join situation.  If a member from group 2 were to leave, (4b) 
would be unicast to all remaining SS in sub-group 2.  Next, 
(5b) and (6b) would be broadcast to the respective members 
not in sub-group 2.  The difference between join and leaves is 
that with a leave there is no benefit of delaying the new 
GTEK broadcast until the end of the entire re-keying process.  
Once a SS receives updated SGKEK material, it will 
definitely be able to decrypt the next GTEK.  Therefore, if an 
SS that has already received new SGKEK material in the 
middle of another leave process decides to leave as well, no 
re-keying can be combined and another re-keying process 
must commence.  In this event messages (4b), (5b), and (6b) 
are sent by the BS; they are identical to their counterparts 
except for the inclusion of the newest GTEK. 
BS SS: {SGKEK1234,SGKEK12,SGKEK2,GTEK}KEK (4b) 
BS⇒SSSG3, SSSG4: {SGKEK1234, GTEK}SGKEK34        (5b) 





The mobility of nodes is an essential feature of 802.16e. 
However, the joining/leaving event due to the movement of 
one mobile SS node will force the entire multicast group to 
renew the group key in order to maintain forward secrecy and 
backward secrecy. It can be perceived that if the multicast 
group consists of a large number of fast moving nodes, then 
the group rekeying will be performed frequently. If we can 
make use of membership and mobility information, which can 
be gathered in the application layer, then the performance of 
ELAPSE protocol can be improved by reducing the amount of 
group rekeying messages. We name this improved version as 
ELAPSE+. Assuming we have additional mobility 
information from the application layer for each SS node 
available when it joins the BS’s multicast group, we can pass 
this information to the MAC layer. A relatively more mobile 
SS node means that it will leave the multicast group sooner 
than a predefined duration. According to the IEEE 802.16e 
standard [2], the support for node mobility is up to 150km/h, 
and the access range of a BS can be up to 15km for mobile 
nodes. Therefore, 12 minutes seems to be an appropriate 
threshold for defining fast moving nodes as it is the time 
needed for the fastest node to cross a BS cell via the diameter. 
However, the average mobility pattern and membership 
duration of nodes can be quite different in various 
circumstances. For example, the average mobility pattern 
observed by a BS deployed around a highway must differ 
sharply from the average mobility pattern observed by a BS 
deployed in a rural area. In fact, the access range of a BS is 
also influenced by the average mobility pattern it supports. 
For another example, in the pay per view application most 
membership duration may be aligned with the length of the 
program, but in an online gaming scenario there is no such 
boundary. In order to reduce the amount of group rekeying 
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messages, an implementer may want to find out the 
approximate distribution of node speed and membership 
duration in the application scenario and set up the duration 
threshold accordingly. 
With this additional cross-layer information available to the 
BS, the modification is very simple to carry out based on the 
ELAPSE protocol. First, we differentiate the sub-groups in 
ELAPSE. Some specific sub-groups are designated for fast 
moving SS nodes and by selecting an appropriate duration we 
make the size of those specific sub-groups smaller than other 
sub-groups. Then, every time a node tagged by the application 
layer as fast moving requests to join the multicast group, it 
will be put in one of the designated sub-groups instead of the 
sub-group with the lowest member count. For the same 
example used in the introduction of ELAPSE with 600 SS 
nodes and 8 sub-groups, if we know there are 60 fast moving 
SS nodes, then those 60 SS nodes can be put into 2 sub-
groups with averagely 30 SS nodes each. The rest of 
relatively slow moving SS nodes can be put into 6 sub-groups 
with averagely 90 SS nodes each. This way, when member 
join/leave occurs, the number of message (4) in ELAPSE (the 
unicast message) will be decreased for those fast moving sub-
groups. Even though the average number of message (4) will 
be increased for those slow moving sub-groups, the net 
tradeoff should be fewer number of messages (4) in total, 
since fast moving sub-groups will constitute most of the joins 
and leaves. In Section VI our simulation results confirm that 
with one simple modification of dividing groups into two 
types, we are able to improve the performance by 4~7% when 
compared to ELAPSE. We believe it is reasonable to assert 
that if we can optimize sub-group differentiation, which 
means more levels of sub-groups according to node mobility, 





 In the previous sections, we have overviewed the MBRA 
in 802.16e and its problems in security and efficiency, and 
introduced our ELAPSE and ELAPSE+ schemes that aim to 
address these problems. Next, we use theoretical analysis and 
empirical simulations to evaluate the security properties and 
efficiency performances of ELAPSE and ELAPSE+.  
 
A. Security Analysis  
 
As mentioned previously, we show that ELAPSE and 
ELAPSE+ provide backward and forward secrecy because at 
a join or multi-join event, the group key is updated, and at a 
leave event, the group key and all the sub-group key known to 
the leaving node are updated. Moreover, it is easy to verify 
that ELAPSE and ELAPSE+ is secure against collusion 
attacks by nodes that have left the group, because they cannot 
learn anything about the generation and distribution of the 
new key(s), as analyzed in [21].  Therefore, we can conclude 
that ELAPSE and ELAPSE+ possess the required security 
properties and are suitable for providing secure multicast 
services. 
 
B. Efficiency Analysis 
 
To evaluate the efficiency of ELAPSE, its communication 
and space complexity will be compared to other mulitcast 
approaches.  In the simple flat scheme, such as the MBRA in 
802.16, the server (group manager) should send rekeying 
messages to each group member respectively, with the new 
group key (GTEK in 802.16) encrypted with its secrete key 
(AK) shared with server (BS).  Thus the communication 
complexity is O(n), server space complexity is O(1) 
(disregarding the individual AKs, which are created during 
authentication), and member space complexity is O(1).  In the 
LKH scheme the communication complexity is O(log n) for 
the rekeying procedure; the server space complexity is O(n) 
and member space complexity is O(log n).   
For ELAPSE, the exact complexity is determined by the 
number of subgroups, and the ranges of these complexities 
illustrate the tradeoffs associated with the choice of the 
number of subgroups. When the number of subgroups 
increases (from 1 to N, N = 2k, 1 ≤ N ≤ n), it can be 
generalized that the communication complexity decreases 
from O(n) to log N + m, where m is the number of current 
members in the subgroup to be updated.  It is easy to see that 
when N increases, m will decrease, and when N = n, it 
becomes equivalent to the LKH scheme.  As for the space 
complexity, the server space complexity increases from O(1) 
to 2N – 1 (the group key plus all the intermediate key in the 
hierarchy), and the member space complexity also increases 
from O(1) to log N + 1 (every key on the path from the 
subgroup to the root in the key hierarchy).  The tradeoff 
between the communication complexity and the space 
complexity is up to the implementor.  The authors in [17] find 
a (perhaps) optimal balance among these tradeoffs by dividing 
the group into subgroups with O(log n) members each.  With 
this many sub-groups the communication complexity is still 
O(log n), the same degree as in LKH scheme, while the server 
space complexity is down to O(n/log n), and the member 
space is O(log n).  However, due to the dynamic nature of 
membership and different node mobility levels it is difficult to 
always maintain equal-sized subgroups, let alone handling the 
case of multi-join. 
The exact efficiency of ELAPSE+ is difficult to determine 
since it depends on the size of different types of sub-groups 
according to node mobilities. However, it is straightforward to 
see that the performance of ELAPSE+ should be close to 
ELAPSE in big O notation, while ELAPSE+ decreases the 
total number of unicasts to certain degree based on different 
mobility nature of sub-groups. 
 
C. Simulation Results 
To compare the performance, we simulate MBRA, 
ELAPSE, and ELASPE+ by randomly generating join and 
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leave events. Two big sets of simulations have been 
performed. One allows up to 512 SS nodes and the other 
allows 1024 SS nodes. Within each set of simulations, tests 
have been done with different number of sub-groups, 8, 16, 
and 32, respectively. All tests are done using the same 
sequence of random events which include about 6000 joins 
and leaves, respectively. For the case of ELAPSE+, we 
differentiate about one thirds of the SS nodes to be fast 
moving and the rest to be slow moving, and different sub-
groups are set up accordingly. For all the simulation runs we 
use the BS as point of reference for collecting statistics. The 
total number of messages and total amount of 
communications sent from the BS are used to evaluate the 
efficiency. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 2 through 
Fig. 5. 
In Figs. 2 and 3, messages were tallied as unicast or 
multicast.  Broadcast messages such as broadcast GTEK 
update mode messages were counted as multicast.  Counting 
messages with the 802.16 was straightforward, as key 
response messages sent on join and leave, and GKEK update 
mode messages were counted as unicast.  The broadcast 
GTEK update mode message was counted as multicast.  For 
ELAPSE and ELAPSE+, all key response messages within 
the sub-group of the joining/leaving node were counted as 
unicast. The other messages, SGKEK and GTEK updates, 




































































































Fig. 3  Message counts for different protocols (1024 nodes) 
In Figs. 4 and 5, the total units of communications are 
calculated as the sum of the number of keys in each message. 
For example in ELAPSE each unicast message (4) will add 
log(N) + 1 units to the total communication counts, where N 
is the total number of sub-groups.  
A point about the implementation of the 802.16 MBRA 
must be made with respect to SS join and leave events.  In the 
current standard, there is no explicit behavior defined, so we 
will assume the BS rekeys the entire group at every join and 
leave event.  If it is to be assumed that no rekeying is 
performed on member joins and leaves and only on GTEK 
expiration, the number of messages sent would be drastically 
lower (equal to the number of join events that occurred during 
simulation).  However, there would be lapses in secrecy on 
every join (and leave) equivalent to the amount of data sent 
before (and after).  For these reasons, rekeying on SS joining 
and leaving was included with the 802.16 MBRA simulations 
so that all algorithms could be compared strictly in terms of 
efficiency, with the requirement that each algorithm ensures 




































































































Fig. 5  Total communications by message units (1024 nodes) 
 
From Figs. 2 and 3 it is obvious that to reach the same level 
of security ELAPSE and ELAPSE+ need much less number 
of messages to be transmitted by the BS, and Figs. 4 and 5 tell 
us that even considering message size, which is measured by 
the number of keys in each message, the total amount of 
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communications needed to be done by the BS is less than half 
of the MBRA case. For both message counts and total 
communications our ELAPSE+ is about 4~7% less than our 
ELAPSE in each simulation scenario. Message counts (Figs. 2 
and 3) will increase for both ELAPSE and ELAPSE+ when 
number of sub-groups increases, i.e. average sub-group size 
decreases, while total communications (Figs. 4 and 5) will be 
optimized when number of sub-groups is at certain level 
(when the number of sub-groups is 16 for 512 nodes case and 
32 for 1024 nodes case). Both results agree with our 




In this paper we have reviewed the challenges of secure 
multicast, and analyzed the MBRA of IEEE 802.16, as it is a 
noteworthy example of these challenges emerging in next 
generation networks.  In terms of security, MBRA is an 
incomplete solution by not guaranteeing secrecy of messages 
before and after member joins and leaves, respectively.  As 
for distributing keying material, it is inefficient, and does not 
take advantage of the recent research demonstrating the 
effectiveness of hierarchical approaches.  The approach 
presented in this paper, ELAPSE and ELAPSE+, provide 
backward and forward secrecy and outperform the 802.16 
MBRA in simulation.  This does come at a cost of increased 
server and member space requirement, but this tradeoff is a 
matter of heightened requirements on the hardware that is to 
actually implement the 802.16 standard.  Given the rapidly 
decreasing cost of client side hardware and the substantial 
requirements already in place on the server hardware, we 
believe the increased space requirement is reasonable and 
acceptable.  
In the future work, we will continue to optimize ELAPSE+ 
sub-group differentiation technique, with the attempt to 
minimize message counts and total communications, by 
refining the additional information that could be passed from 
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